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CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS FOR JUVENILE
TRANSFER PROCEDURE: THE TEN YEARS SINCE
KENT V. UNITED S TA TES
Michael Vitiello*
Kent v. United States introduced due process safeguards into
the procedure for transferring juveniles from the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court to that of adult criminal court. In the ten
years since Kent, courts, as well as legislatures, have sought to
avoid the holding of Kent. In this Article, the author analyzes
these attempted evasions of the Kent holding as well as the
problems that have arisen due to the Court's failure to address
the substantive requirements in waiving jurisdiction. The au-
thor concludes by challenging the judicial system to address it-
self to broader considerations of juvenile justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been ten years since the United States Supreme Court
decided Kent v. United States,' the first case arising out of the
juvenile justice system to be reviewed by the Court.2 Kent held
that where a state creates a juvenile court system, a minor cannot
be transferred out of it without being afforded constitutional due
process procedures: a hearing, access by counsel to reports consid-
ered by the juvenile court in making the transfer decision, and a
statement of reasons for the juvenile court's decision to waive
jurisdiction.3 This latter requirement, when read in light of the
juvenile court system's purpose, to provide treatment for juvenile
offenders,4 implies that while a juvenile remains amenable to
* B.A. Swarthmore College, 1969; J.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1974; Member of
Pennsylvania Bar and New Jersey Bar. The author wishes to thank Wilbur L. Kipnes,
Esquire, for his careful editing and thoughtful comments.
1. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
2. See Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases,
1966 Sup. CT. REV. 107 (1966). See also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 531-33
(1971). Two prior Supreme Court cases dealt with a juvenile's rights once the juvenile had
been transferred to adult criminal court. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
3. 383 U.S. at 557.
4. Id. at 554-55:
The theory of the District's Juvenile Court Act, like that of other jurisdictions,
is rooted in social welfare philosophy rather than in the corpusjuris. Its proceed-
ings are designated as civil rather than criminal. The Juvenile Court is theoreti-
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treatment the juvenile court cannot waive jurisdiction. Unfortun-
ately, the Court did not delineate substantive criteria of amena-
bility to treatment applicable to all jurisdictions. 5 Instead, the
Court held that a jurisdiction must apply its statutory substan-
tive criteria in determining whether to waive juvenile jurisdic-
tion. Consequently, in the ten years following Kent, courts and
legislatures have wrestled with the undefined concept of "amena-
ble to treatment"6 and often applied variable criteria.
II. THE HOLDING OF Kent
Morris A. Kent, Jr., while on probation under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court, was picked up as a suspect in a case of
housebreaking and rape.7 Without conducting the full investiga-
tion required by statute,8 the juvenile court judge transferred
Kent to the criminal jurisdiction of the district court.' After Kent
was found guilty of housebreaking and innocent, by reason of
insanity, of rape, he was ordered to serve his sentence as a psychi-
atric patient at St. Elizabeth's Hospital.
In reviewing Kent's appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that
the disposition of minors within the juvenile court system is not
constitutionally mandated. ° The Court did hold that once a juve-
nile court system is authorized by statute, as Congress had done
in the District of Columbia, a juvenile could not be transferred
cally engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society rather than
adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of guid-
ance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix crimi-
nal responsibility, guilt and punishment. The State is parens patriae rather
than prosecuting attorney and judge. (footnote omitted)
5. See Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 INn.
L. J. 583 (1968). The author observed that Kent introduces procedural regularity, but fails
to indicate substantive criteria. Id. at 602.
6. 383 U.S. at 542-43.
7. Id. at 543.
8. D.C. CODE §11-914 (1961). The relevant provisions of the statute are set forth at 383
U.S. at, 547-48:
If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which would
amount to a felony in the case of an adult . . . the judge may, after full
investigation, waive jurisdiction and order such child held for trial under the
regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of such offense if
committed by an adult . . ..
9. 383 U.S. at 546.
10. Id. at 557.
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to adult criminal court and withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the
juvenile justice system without the benefit of procedures embody-
ing certain due process safeguards." The Court stated that there
is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such
tremendous consequences without ceremony-without hearing,
without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of
reasons. 
2
By including the requirement of an accompanying statement of
reasons as an integral part of the waiver procedure, the Court
indicated concern that the juvenile court's decision be capable of
being subjected to a meaningful appellate review. 3 Because the
Court specifically declined the opportunity to review the merits
of the juvenile court's decision to transfer Kent to the district
court, it did not articulate substantive standards to determine
amenability to treatment.
However the Court did cite as the basis for the judge's state-
ment of reasons, substantive elements of amenability to treat-
ment provided by the District of Columbia statute. 5 Those fac-
tors are as follows:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggres-
sive, violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the offense was against persons or against
property.
4. The merit of the complaint.
5. Where the codefendants are adults, the desirability of
trying the entire action at one trial.
11. Id. "We believe that this result is required by the statute read in the context of
constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel."
12. Id. at 554. The transfer of a juvenile has been called the "most severe sanction" that
can be imposed on a juvenile. Schornhorst, supra note 5, at 586. In many jurisdictions, a
finding of delinquency continues jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the child until he
turns twenty-one, thereby strictly limiting the term of sentence. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §11-
1551 (Supp. V, 1965); ALASKA STAT. §47.10.080 (c)(1) (commitment until offender's twen-
tieth birthday); cf. N.J. REV. STAT. 2A: 4-37 (allowing juvenile courts to sentence beyond
the offender's twenty-first birthday in some instances). If certified, however, the juvenile
obviously faces the full range of possible adult punishment. See, e.g., Ander v. Common-
wealth, 465 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1971) (life imprisonment for 16 year old); Tucker v. State,
482 P.2d 939 (Okla. Crim. 1971) (20 years for a 14 year old).
13. 383 U.S. at 561.
14. Id. at 542-43.
15. Id. at 566-67.
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6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile.
7. Previous contact with the juvenile court.
8. The likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juve-
nile.'"
Though not part of the ratio decidendi of the Kent holding, the
District of Columbia statutory appendix standards have been
adopted in subsequent judicial decisions'" and in other state stat-
utes enacted to conform with Kent.'" The citation of the stan-
dards apparently represents the Court's sanction of the District
of Columbia criteria of amenability to treatment. Application of
these standards, however, is not without serious analytical prob-
lems."
The majority"0 of the Kent appendix standards are easily ap-
plied. They are basically objective, readily calculated determina-
tions. However, two of the criteria, likelihood of rehabilitation
and sophistication, impliedly require the opinion of social scien-
tists.' The area of greatest difficulty and interest is the elusive
concept of likelihood of rehabilitation because of the magnitude
of the consequences to the young offender of the decision to trans-
fer him to criminal court. A basic premise of our juvenile court
philosophy is that, whenever feasible, a child should be treated,
not punished,2 and that hope for rehabilitation, not demand for
retribution, motivates the society's treatment of the child. The
case law does not, however, inspire confidence that the ameliora-
tive effect of Kent has been realized.23
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., State v. Lemon, 110 Ariz. 568, 521 P.2d 1000 (1974); Kern v. State, 522
P.2d 644 (Okla. Crim. 1974); Mikulovsky v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 699, 196 N.W.2d 748 (1972).
18. The Pennsylvania Juvenile Act (Dec. 6, 1972), Pub. L. 1464, No. 333, §1 et seq., 11
PA. STAT. 50-325(a).
19. See Schornhorst, supra note 5, at 28.
20. The factors are (1) the seriousness of the offense, (2) the aggressiveness of manner,
(3) whether the offense was against persons, (4) the merit of the complaint, (5) the
desirability of trying the juvenile with any adult codefendants, (6) former contact with
the juvenile system.
21. See notes 104-06 and accompanying text infra.
22. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
YOUTH CRME (1967); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104 (1909). But see Fox,
Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970).
[Vol. 26:23
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III. AREAS OF NONAPPLICATION OF THE Kent HOLDING
Some courts have accepted several arguments that limit Kent's
application. One ground frequently cited, prior to the Supreme
Court's opinion in In re Gault,24 was that Kent applied only in the
District of Columbia because the procedural rights announced
were derived solely from an interpretation of the District of Col-
umbia Code. 5 The argument that Kent was limited to the Dis-
trict of Columbia was resolved in Gault in which the Court held
that although the decision in Kent relied on the language of the
statute, the basic requirements of due process and fairness must
be satisfied in all waivers of juvenile court jurisdiction." There-
fore, even though Kent does not mandate a state to create a
juvenile court or prevent a waiver to be effected by means other
than a judicial hearing, once a jurisdiction does create such a
23. There is serious question whether the high hopes for the juvenile justice system have
ever been fulfilled. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at
556. "[T]here may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds:
that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children;" TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22. "Studies by the
Commission, legislative inquiries in various States, and reports by informed observers
compel the conclusion that the great hopes originally held for the juvenile court have not
been fulfilled." Id. at 7.
24. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault held that Fourteenth Amendment due process mandates
that in juvenile court proceedings, as a result of which a juvenile may be committed to
an institution, the child and the child's parents or guardian must be (1) given notice
sufficient to permit a defense to the charges; (2) notified of the right to counsel, including
the right to court appointed counsel; and (3) advised the child is entitled to the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination privilege and the Sixth Amendment rights to confronta-
tion and cross-examination.
25. A Maryland statement is typical that Kent "dealt solely with, and was expressly
limited to, the interpretation to be given to" the Juvenile Court Act of the District of
Columbia. Hazell v. State, 12 Md.App. 144, 151, 277 A.2d 639, 642 (1971); accord, Stanley
v. Peyton, 292 F. Supp. 209 (W.D. Va. 1968); Holmes v. State, 224 Ga. 553, 163 S.E.2d
807 (1968); People v. Sprinkle, 4 Ill.App.3d 6, 280 N.E.2d 29 (1972); Hammer v. State, 3
Md.App. 96, 238 A.2d 567 (1968); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 363 Mass. 640, 296
N.E.2d 194 (1973); Lujan v. District Court, 161 Mont. 287, 505 P.2d 896 (1973); Neller v.
State, 79 N.M. 528, 445 P.2d 949 (1968); State v. Acuna, 78 N.M. 119, 428 P.2d 658 (1967);
In re Bullard, 22 N.C.App. 245, 206 S.E.2d 305 (1974); State v. Johnson, 5 N.C.App. 469,
168 S.E.2d 711 (1969); Runge v. State, 86 S.D. 9, 190 N.W.2d 381 (1971); Cradle v. Peyton,
208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874 (1967); Mullin v. State, 505 P.2d 305 (Wyo. 1973). Contra,
United States ex rel. Turner v. Rundle, 438 F.2d 839, 842 n.ll (3d Cir. 1971) which gives
exhaustive collection of authority.
26. 387 U.S. at 12. See also Schornhorst, supra note 5, at 602: "After a careful reading
of Kent and Gault, a question as to the constitutional status of the holdings in the former
case would seem pure rhetoric."
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procedure, due process must be followed.27
A second method employed to avoid following the rationale of
Kent is to argue that its holding should apply prospectively only.
As a result, the requirements of a statement of reasons to waive
jurisdiction and the right to counsel generally have not been ex-
tended to juveniles incarcerated before Kent."8 In refusing to
apply Kent retroactively, courts have emphasized that the hear-
ing is not a finding of guilt or innocence,29 and that the subse-
quent trial is an adequate guarantee that the fact finding process
was not impaired. 0
However, this line of reasoning was rejected in Kemplen v.
Maryland.' This case suggests that Gault and Kent when read
together require that due process, including appointment of
counsel, be afforded the juvenile at every stage which affects his
substantial rights. 2 The court found that the "waiver hearing is
much more than a mere 'preliminary hearing establishing proba-
ble cause.' ,3 While innocence is not decided in the waiver pro-
ceeding, the question of fitness for rehabilitation is not relitigated
at trial. Therefore, improper waiver or failure to provide a mean-
ingful hearing, followed by a criminal conviction, permanently
deprives the offender of facilities open to other juveniles.
27. 383 U.S. at 562.
28. See Harris v. Procunier, 498 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 970 (1974);
Mordecai v. United States, 421 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 977 (1969); United States v. Wilkerson, 262 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1967); In re Harris,
67 Cal.2d 876, 434 P.2d 615, 64 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1967); Fields v. Commonwealth, 498 S.W.
2d 130 (Ky. 1974); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 304 (Ky. 1971); Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1967); Hammer v. State, 3 Md.App.96, 238 A.2d 567
(1968); Powell v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 684, 462 P.2d 756 (1969); State v. Fair, 263 Ore. 383,
502 P.2d 1150 (1972); Bouge v. Reed, 254 Ore. 418, 459 P.2d 869 (1969); Common-
wealth v. James, 440 Pa. 205, 269 A.2d 898 (1970); Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156
S.E.2d 874 (1967).
29. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. James, 440 Pa. 205, 269 A.2d 898 (1970).
30. See, e.g., T.K. v. State, 126 Ga.App. 269, 190 S.E.2d 592 (1972); Powell v. Sheriff,
85 Nev. 684, 462 P.2d 756 (1969).
31. 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970). See also Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); James v. Cox, 323 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Va. 1971).
32. 428 F.2d at 173, citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
33. 428 F.2d at 173.
[Piresence of counsel at the waiver hearing is essential to the fairness of that
process. . . .There is a very real danger in any waiver proceeding that, without
the presence of counsel for the accused, juvenile jurisdiction will be waived on
the basis of unreliable or untrue information.
[Vol. 26:23
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Courts have hesitated to extend retroactively the rights af-
forded by Kent to petitioners who are now adults, in part because
of the difficulty of framing an adequate remedy for "geriatric
juveniles. '34 If on remand, the court finds that waiver was im-
proper, it is no longer possible to treat the now adult offender in
a juvenile facility. Release, therefore, is thought to be the only
alternative.3 1 But release is a poor substitute for the now unavail-
able chance of rehabilitation, especially from society's point of
view.
This position, however, is overstated. Theoretically, at least, an
offender who originally was amenable to treatment but did not
receive it should still be in need of treatment. If that is the case,
and the offender poses a threat to society or himself, then the
offender is a fit subject for civil commitment under the ordinary
civil commitment statute.31 If the offender was originally amen-
able to treatment, but is somehow rehabilitated and no longer in
need of treatment after serving time in prison, then society has
no further interest in detaining him.37
Another rationale to avoid the Kent decision is that a guilty
plea waives due process infirmities in the juvenile hearing proce-
dure. Transfers which were invalid because counsel was denied 5
34. Id. at 178. Cf. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541.
Ordinarily we would reverse the Court of Appeals and direct the District Court
to remand the case to the Juvenile Court for a new determination of waiver
. . . .However, petitioner has now passed the age of 21 and the Juvenile Court
can no longer exercise jurisdiction over him ....
Id. at 564.
35. 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970).
36. Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d 408, 409-12 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
37. This problem was addressed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Kent
v. United States, id. At the time the case was on remand, Kent was no longer a juvenile.
He argued that the juvenile court should have taken steps towards civil commitment in
Saint Elizabeth's Hospital. Id. at 409. The court of appeals agreed and concluded that
because the waiver of 1961 was improper, the criminal proceedings against Kent were
invalid and had to be vacated. The court noted, however, that the government still could
institute civil commitment proceedings against Kent to insure that he remained in the
hospital for as long as public safety required. Id. at 412.
38. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johnson, 364 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1966); Eyman v. Superior
Court, 9 Ariz.App. 6, 448 P.2d 878 (1968); State v. Salazar, 79 N.M. 592, 446 P.2d 644
(1968); State v. Johnson, 5 N.C.App. 469, 168 S.E.2d 711 (1969); Crumley v. State, 3
Tenn. Crim. 385, 462 S.W.2d 252 (1970). Contra, Powell v. Hocker, 453 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.
1971); Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 68 Wash.2d 481, 413 P.2d 940 (1966).
1976]
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or no statement of reasons was supplied39 have been upheld when
the defendant pleaded guilty subsequent to the transfer. A guilty
plea is relevant only to criminal liability. It cannot be construed
as an admission that the offender is not amenable to treatment.
In addition, improper waiver prevents the offender from being
sentenced by the juvenile court and, thus, theoretically results in
an illegal sentence, a basis for relief traditionally not waived by
a guilty plea."
IV. AMENABILITY TO TREATMENT: A MEANINGFUL STANDARD?
Although Kent has risen above some courts' efforts to limit it
to the District of Columbia statute or prospective decisions, the
question still remains whether Kent's "amenability to treat-
ment" standard is meaningful in waiver decisions. By requiring
a statement of reasons before a waiver can be entered, the Court
forces the juvenile court judge to state substantive reasons why
the minor is not amenable to treatment. An empirical study con-
ducted in 1969"' indicates, however, the wide variety and often
questionable criteria employed by juvenile judges in setting forth
the substantive elements of amenability to treatment. For exam-
ple, over 25% of the responding judges considered as highly im-
portant the economy of a single trial with adult codefendants,42
while 17% admitted that they were influenced by public feelings
and the demand for retribution.43 Moreover, as indicative of the
failure of the present system, judges reported no consistent opin-
ion as to the percentage of juveniles appearing before them who
were capable of rehabilitation" and admitted that waivers some-
times were granted simply because juvenile institutions were
39. See, e.g., Smith v. Cady, 452 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1971); Neller v. State, 79 N.M. 528,
445 P.2d 949 (1969).
40. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Sanders v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 380, 207 A.2d 789
(1965).
41. Comment, Waiver of Jurisdiction in Juvenile Courts, 30 OHIo ST. L.J. 132 (1969).
The author of the Comment analyzed questionaires answered by 50 of 95 Ohio juvenile
court judges to whom it was sent. The study is undoubtedly limited both in its numerical
sample and in its geographical location. It is, however, consistent with cases analyzed in
this Article that suggest that questionable criteria often motivate the transfer decision.
42. Id. at 137.
43. Id. at 138.
44. Id. The percentages varied from 60 to 99%.
[Vol. 26:23
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overcrowded rather than because the offender was untreatable.45
Given these arbitrary decisions, it is questionable whether
"amenability to treatment" or the related "best interest" stan-
dard used by some states is sufficiently self-defining to provide
the juvenile courts with adequate guidelines. The issue of whether
transfer criteria provide objective standards to guide the juvenile
court judge has recently received considerable attention. In
People v. Fields,"6 the Michigan Supreme Court characterized its
state's "best interest" test" as "subject to so many possible in-
terpretations as to be no standard at all."" Shortly after the de-
cision in Fields, the Michigan court system adopted a court rule
that included criteria that paralleled those provided in the Kent
appendix. Subsequently, in In re Jackson," the court held that
a waiver pursuant to the rule was proper because "amenable to
treatment" when read with the Kent appendix criteria is suffi-
ciently precise to meet constitutional muster. 0
Several jurisdictions, however, have held that the "best inter-
est" standard does conform with due process.' For instance, in
Clemons v. State,5" the Indiana court held that the "best inter-
est" standard offered sufficiently precise guidelines, especially
when prior case law, including Kent, was incorporated into the
statutory provision.53 Similarly, in In re F.R. W. ," the Wisconsin
Supreme Court cited Wisconsin precedent for the incorporation
of the Kent criteria into its statutory "best interest" standard."
Further, the court emphasized the imprecision inherent in the
concept of the child's best interest as a justification for not requir-
45. Id. at 138-39.
46. 388 Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217 (1972).
47. MICH. C.L.A. §712A.1; M.S.A. §27.3178 (598.1) (1973).
48. Id., cited at 388 Mich. at 73, 199 N.W.2d at 220.
49. 46 Mich.App. 764, 208 N.W.2d 526 (1973).
50. Id. at 769, 208 N.W.2d at 529-30.
51. See, e.g., Comment, Delegation of Legislative Power to Judiciary, 1973 Wis. L. REV.
259 (1973); Clemons v. State, 317 N.E.2d 859 (Ind. App. 1974); In re Juvenile, 306 N.E.2d
822 (Mass. 1974); Sherfield v. State, 511 P.2d 598 (Okla. 1973); In re Bullard, 22 N.C.App.
245, 206 S.E.2d 305 (1974); In re Salas, 520 P.2d 874 (Utah 1974); In re F.R.W., 61 Wis.2d
193, 212 N.W.2d 130 (1973). See also State v. Owens, 197 Kan. 212, 416 P.2d 259 (1966);
State v. Doyal, 59 N.M. 454, 286 P.2d 306 (1955).
52. 317 N.E.2d 859 (Ind. App. 1974).
53. Id. at 863.
54. 61 Wis.2d 193, 212 N.W.2d 130 (1973).
55. Id. at 205, 212 N.W.2d at 136.
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ing more stringent standards. An Oklahoma court also adopted
this view and held that even though the state's statute was vague
on its face, when supplemented by Kent, the statute did not
violate due process.5"
Thus, courts are almost unanimous that the "best interest"
standard, an even less precise standard than "amenability to
treatment," provides meaningful guidelines for the juvenile court
judge, especially when Kent criteria are considered. Therefore,
analysis of the case law should offer insight into whether the Kent
criteria are in fact employed by transferring courts.
V. AMENABILITY To TREATMENT: SPECIFIC CRITERIA
Requiring the juvenile court judge to include a statement of
reasons in a waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction indicates the
desire of the Court to provide some uniformity in the review of
such waivers. The failure of the Supreme Court in Kent, however,
to define the substantive requirements of such a statement has
led lower courts to rely on some Kent criteria to the exclusion of
others 7 or to use non-Kent considerations in determining amena-
bility to treatment." Consequently, the goal of uniformity has not
been reached and the minor's right to treatment is not being
adequately protected. The following discussion isolates some of
the criteria employed by various juvenile judges in determining
if a juvenile is amenable to treatment.
Perhaps the most detailed treatment of the waiver problem
appears in Mikulovsky v. State.5" There, the juvenile court
waived jurisdiction over a seventeen-year-old who murdered both
his parents. The court based its decision primarily on the testi-
mony of the investigating detective, but applied the eight Kent
appendix criteria.
The Mikulovsky court emphasized the seriousness of the of-
fense6" as the decisive factor in the transfer decision. Obviously,
other Kent criteria such as whether the offense was committed
56. Sherfield v. State, 511 P.2d 598, 602 (Okla. 1973).
57. See notes 59-75 and accompanying text infra.
58. See notes 76-97 and accompanying text infra.
59. 54 Wis.2d 699, 196 N.W.2d 748 (1972).
60. Id. at 706, 196 N.W.2d at 752, where the judge cited "the lack of remorse, which is
evident by this heinous crime, has shocked this Court to its roots."
[Vol. 26:23
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against persons or against property amount to little more than
that the crime was of a serious nature. The Mikulovsky court,
however, went beyond this and concluded that sophistication and
likelihood of treatment were directly related to the heinousness
of the juvenile's action.6 ' Yet, it does not seem that the heinous-
ness of an offense is sufficient to certify a juvenile to adult court
unless the offense is one for which the legislature has provided for
automatic certification.2 Further, in light of the juvenile court
philosophy in favor of retaining jurisdiction over treatable chil-
dren, 3 an offender such as Mikulovsky may be capable of rehabil-
itation despite the seriousness of the offense. The Mikulovsky
court did not consider psychological or psychiatric testimony that
might have indicated whether the juvenile was a likely recidiv-
ist."4 The prior record of the juvenile, while seemingly of value in
determining amenability to treatment, was rejected as irrelevant
by the Mikulovsky court.6" The juvenile, in fact, had no previous
record.6" Thus, the court rejected one indication that the murder
was unique in the juvenile's life, and an act unlikely to be re-
peated. The defendant's lack of a prior record failed to be an
important factor in the waiver decision.
The reviewing court rejected the need for such analysis when
the seriousness of the offense and the surrounding circumstances
outweighed the absence of prior offenses. 7 Thus viewed, the
61. Id. at 705-06, 196 N.W.2d at 751-52.
62. See notes 147-157 and accompanying text infra.
63. See In re Whittington, 17 Ohio App.2d 164, 245 N.E.2d 364 (1969); Comment, supra
note 41, at 624:
Emphasizing that the juvenile system was established to rehabilitate the youth-
ful offender, the court [in In re Whittington] determined that jurisdiction could
not be relinquished unless the juvenile court found, on sufficient evidence, that
the youth could not be rehabilitated within the facilities available to the juve-
nile system . . ..
64. 54 Wis.2d at 707, 196 N.W.2d at 752-53. Cf. State v. Gibbs, 94 Ida. 908, 916-17, 500
P.2d 209, 217 (1972), in which the court condemns the failure to make inquiry into mental
and emotional development of the child and states:
[t]he nature of the alleged and past offenses is relevant to the question of the
defendant's present state of development, but standing alone, it fails to estab-
lish sufficient grounds for waiving jurisdiction. A valid waiver must be based
on a specific finding . . . that the defendant is not amenable to rehabilitative
treatment . . ..
65. Id. at 705-06, 196 N.W.2d at 752.
66. Id. See also State v. Jump, 309 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. App. 1974).
67. Id. at 708, 196 N.W.2d at 753.
19761
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court's finding of nonamenability to treatment amounts to little
more than a finding that the juvenile was nearing his majority
and that the offense was serious."
The remaining criteria of Kent not only seem to be of less
importance to the court's analysis than the seriousness of the
offense, but also have no bearing on whether the juvenile is
amenable to treatment. That a complaint has merit appears to
be irrelevant to the issue of fair treatment of the juvenile. Also,
the desirability of a single trial with adult codefendants is unre-
lated to a determination whether a juvenile can be treated suc-
cessfully in a juvenile facility"5 and in addition can be criticized
by two due process arguments."
Prior Contact with the Juvenile Court System
Conversely, if a defendant has a prior record, his former contact
with the juvenile correctional services is frequently cited to his
disadvantage as a factor in transferring him to adult criminal
court.7' For example, in In re Anonymous" the Arizona Appellate
68. Cf. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alas. 1972), which comes to the same result, but
does so explicitly.
69. Joinder no doubt is often a tool of efficient administration of justice. However, apart
from efficiency, it is unclear why participation in crime with an adult is relevant. Argua-
bly, a juvenile who conspires with an adult may be more sophisticated than one who
conspires with his peers. Sophistication, however, is a distinct criterion under the Kent
criteria.
70. First, prior to In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), prosecutors may have been
motivated to try a weak case before a juvenile court which would apply a lesser standard
of proof than did criminal courts. Second, certifying a juvenile in order to join him with
an adult offender is indefensible in light of due process. See note 69 supra.
71. See, e.g., In re Burtts, 12 Wash.App. 564, 530 P.2d 209 (1975); State v. Lemon, 110
Ariz. 568, 521 P.2d 1000 (1974); In re Salas, 520 P.2d 874 (Utah 1974); State v. Thompson,
502 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. 1973); Madrigal v. State, 85 N.M. 496, 513 P.2d 1278 (1973); Sher-
field v. State, 511 P.2d 598 (Okla. 1973); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Johnson, 501 P.2d
1011 (Ore.App. 1972). But cf. the Supreme Court's decision in Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541 (1966). In some instances, absence of prior contact with the juvenile authorities
is viewed as irrelevant where sufficient other grounds for waiver exist. See, e.g., Mikulov-
sky v. State, 54 Wis.2d 699, 705-06, 196 N.W.2d 748, 752 (1972); Kern v. State, 522 P.2d
644, 648 (Okla.Crim. 1974) ("[Allthough he has little or no prior record with juvenile
authorities he is presently on a two-year deferred sentence from the Criminal Division of
the District Court as an adult"). A novel approach was suggested by the defendant in
People v. Allgood, 54 Cal. App. 3d 434, 444, 126 Cal. Rptr. 666, 673 (1976), but rejected
by the court:
defendant argues that since society has no complete or definitive knowledge of
how to treat law violators successfully, or how to predict future behavior, it is
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Court affirmed the lower court's transfer of a juvenile offender
who had a history of contacts with the juvenile system. The court
cited the psychiatric evaluation that appeared on record, and
concluded that unless there was some appreciable behavior modi-
fication, the juvenile would likely continue acting in a deviant
manner. 7
The psychiatric evaluation underscores the dilemma that
courts must face. The child's illness and need for treatment is
glaring. At the same time, the report indicates the hopelessness
of the situation. No one can pretend any longer that further treat-
ment in existing facilities is likely to help. It is rational to infer
that failure in the past is strong evidence of failure in the future.
Thus, the Arizona court concluded:
There comes a time when a minor's welcome in Juvenile Court
is worn out and he must understand that if he continually re-
fuses to be receptive to treatment under the juvenile system and
continues to be an irresponsible person, the only alternative left
for the Juvenile Court is to transfer him to the adult court for
criminal prosecution .7
Despite the logical relationship between prior contact with the
juvenile system and nonamenability to treatment, one must con-
sider the nature of the prior contacts. For example, some children
who need the services of remedial institutions but cannot get in
because of overcrowding are placed in foster homes under the
theory that any home at all is better than the miserable homes
in which they were raised. The trouble with this practice is that,
in general, such foster home placements are not supervised ade-
quately and the children cannot be helped sufficiently with their
problems. Therefore, past treatment failures may not indicate
that a particular juvenile is not amenable to treatment."5
irrational to find a person unamenable to treatment until that treatment is
attempted. Under that theory no first offender could be referred to the general
criminal court.
72. 14 Ariz.App. 466, 484 P.2d 235 (1971).
73. Id. at 475, 484 P.2d at 242.
74. Id. at 475, 484 P.2d at 243-44.
75. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, on the failure of resources committed to the
juvenile justice system.
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Non-Kent Factors Utilized by Courts in Waiver Determinations
Courts also have based waiver decisions on such factors as
availability of treatment," its cost,77 and emancipation." There
is much to be said for weighing the availability of proper treat-
ment facilities in making the waiver decision.7" A court ought not
incarcerate easily treatable juveniles or petty offenders with juve-
niles who have more serious sociopathic problems. 0 Certainly, it
is relevant to the protection of the community as a whole whether
a juvenile can be treated within existing facilities."'
Such a position, however, can have ironic results. For example,
in P. H. v. State,8" where a juvenile had committed kidnap and a
number of lesbian acts, the court found an "obvious need for
treatment."83 The lack of psychological and rehabilitation serv-
ices, often cited as the bailiwick of the juvenile justice system, 4
was a primary factor in waiving jurisdiction.85 In In re Blakes,8
where a juvenile was charged with stealing a bag of potato chips,
the juvenile court jurisdiction was waived due to a lack of facili-
ties to place the juvenile in the state and a cost in excess of
$950.00 per month for putting the juvenile in another state's facil-
ities.
76. See, e.g., State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Johnson, 501 P.2d 1011 (Ore. App. 1972).
"A court in all juvenile dispositional matters not only may, but must, give careful consid-
eration to availability of such resources." Id. at 1013. See also P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837
(Alas. 1972); In re Blakes, 4 Ill.App.3d 567, 281 N.E.2d 454 (1972); Welfare of J.E.C. v.
State, 225 N.W.2d 245 (Minn. 1975).
77. See, e.g., In re Blakes, 4 Ill.App.3d 567, 281 N.E.2d 454 (1972).
78. See, e.g., In re Pima County, 20 Ariz.App. 10, 509 P.2d 1047 (1973). See also In re
Welfare of Hernandez, 15 Wash. App. 205, 548 P.2d 340 (1976).
79. Although some observers of the juvenile justice system have expressed doubts as to
the success of the treatment in that system, supra note 22, there is some evidence of
reasonable success in some specific programs. See Comment, Juvenile Justice in Transi-
tion, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1144, 1150-51 (1967).
80. See State v. Lemon, 110 Ariz. 568, 521 P.2d 1000 (1974).
81. See In re Salas, 520 P.2d 874 (Utah 1974).
82. 504 P.2d 837 (Alas. 1972).
83. Id. at 846.
84. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1967).
85. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra. If the basis for the court's decision
is the shortness of the time before the juvenile court loses jurisdiction over the juvenile,
civil commitment procedures may guarantee society's safety and the child's need for
treatment.
86. 4 Ill.App.3d 567, 281 N.E.2d 454 (1972).
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Welfare of J. E. C. v. State7 represents the opposite extreme
in the analysis of existing facilities. The trial court waived juris-
diction of a seventeen-year-old charged with aggravated battery
due to a seven year history of offenses and a psychologist report
that existing facilities were ill-suited for hard-core, sophisticated,
aggressive delinquents."8 While sympathizing with the juvenile
court, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the transfer stating
that "the absence of rehabilitation facilities to treat appellant
may not mean he is not amenable to treatment." 9 The court's
finding was grounded on a premise that a juvenile has a right to
rehabilitative treatment and that no legal justification existed to
deny treatment to an eligible offender.
The holding of the Minnesota court is unassailable if one views
the problem of juvenile rehabilitation as a failure of resources."
In turn, a court's willingness to retain jurisdiction may be related
to its view of the likelihood of successful treatment in the juvenile
system at all.2 If a court views the purpose of juvenile justice as
unrealistic, it is likely to overvalue the interest of society in mak-
87. 225 N.W.2d 245 (Minn. 1975).
88. Id. at 247.
89. Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
90. Cf. Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (opinion by Bazelon,
C.J.):
Since the presumption of the statutory framework is that juveniles are to be
treated as juveniles the "full investigation" required before waiver to adult court
must explore all the possible dispositions short of waiver by which the "welfare
of the child and the best interests of the District" ... may be secured . . .. It
is the duty of the judge to insure that the child receives the full benefits prom-
ised by the statutory scheme ....
[Tihe statute commands such an examination of alternatives. Perhaps it is
only by searching for what we need but do not have that future improvements
in knowledge and resources can be hoped for. Whether such hope is justified or
not, a "full investigation" is commanded, and it cannot be mere ritual.
On the issue of right to treatment once an individual is in an institution, id. at 1279-80.
See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
91. There is ample support for such a position. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22,
at 7-8, suggesting that juvenile judges often lack adequate training and that caseloads
prevent even the best trained juvenile personnel from doing an adequate job. See also
McCune & Skoler, Juvenile Court Judges in the United States, 11 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
121 (1965); CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE IN
CALIFORNIA (1960). "Based upon estimates furnished by the juvenile court judges, the
average time spent on a juvenile court case is approximately 10 to 15 minutes. ... Id.
at 16.
92. See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
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ing its waiver decision. Interestingly, however, none of the cited
cases have addressed the available statistical data concerning
juvenile recidivism and rehabilitation."
Finally, select cases point to the additional factor of
emancipation, not cited in the Kent examination of amenability
to treatment. In re Pima County4 dealt with a case unique on its
facts: the juvenile offender, seventeen-years- and eleven-months-
old, already a member of the United States Marine Corps, com-
mitted a particularly violent assault."5 The court relied on two
factors in addition to criteria discussed above. First, the juvenile
had attained the status of an emancipated minor and therefore
was solely responsible for his actions. Second, the rehabilitation
of juveniles, generally attempted through use of the family unit,
was impractical because of his emancipated state and because his
family resided out of the jurisdiction." One would not expect
many other juveniles to be emancipated in the sense that the
juvenile was in the instant case. The importance of the family,
however, has received no consideration elsewhere as a basis for
retaining jurisdiction in the juvenile court despite its relevance to
rehabilitation.97
Summary of Determinative Factors
Based on the case law, a juvenile is most likely to be transferred
if he is close to his eighteenth birthday, has committed a rela-
tively serious offense, and is a recidivist." Another frequently
93. See In re Maricopa County, 18 Ariz.App. 560, 504 P.2d 501 (1972).
Admittedly, the court, in order to adequately inform itself as to all aspects of
the behavioral sciences as they specifically apply to a juvenile, should consider
and be receptive to experts in this field. However, when we consider the nature
of this testimony, the attempt to predict human behavior in a particular indi-
vidual over a definite period of time, the juvenile court should not be limited
solely to such opinion evidence. Rather, the juvenile judge should also properly
consider the particular juvenile's track record in the past and his amenability
to the juvenile processes that this record discloses.
Id. at 504-05.
94. 20 Ariz.App. 10, 509 P.2d 1047 (1973).
95. Id. at 12, 509 P.2d at 1049.
96. Id.
97. See generally Rodman & Grams, Juvenile Delinquency and the Family: A Review
and Discussion, in TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 188-221
(1967). See also People v. Allgood, 54 Cal. App. 3d 434, 126 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1976).
98. Age and seriousness of the offense are separate criteria under the Kent appendix
[Vol. 26:23
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cited basis for transfer is the absence of suitable juvenile facili-
ties." Upon closer examination, however, that criterion may
merely restate the facts that a juvenile is close to his majority and
has committed a serious crime.
While age and seriousness of the offense are obviously relevant
to a court's disposition of a juvenile offender, their importance
can easily be overstated; if a juvenile is treatable but close to the
age when the juvenile court will lose jurisdiction over him, he may
be subject to civil commitment.' 0 Commitment protects the com-
munity interest by segregating the offender from the rest of so-
ciety and also preserves the ideal of the juvenile system that an
offender should be treated rather than punished.
Further, it is not clear whether a juvenile who commits a seri-
ous offense is ipso facto less amenable to treatment than one who
commits a trivial offense. In general, courts have glossed over that
possibility and pointed to the seriousness of the offense as indica-
tive of nonamenability. 0 ' The problem appears to be far more
complex than courts have recognized. For example, one study
indicated that juvenile murderers are model prisoners and low
rate recidivists.'"2 There is also an indication that juvenile offend-
ers can be categorized not by seriousness of the offense but by the
motivational need that the crime fills. °3 A corollary of such a
theory is that one cannot infer capacity for treatment from the
nature of the offense.
The determination of who is amenable to treatment is at best
elusive. It involves subtle predictive judgments not ordinarily
within the expertise of appellate courts. At the same time, it is
unlikely that any court would be willing to defer entirely to expert
opinion.'"'
standards; nonetheless, they are often discussed as relevant indicia of a juvenile's amena-
bility to treatment. See, e.g., P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alas. 1972).
99. See notes 76-93 and accompanying text supra.
100. See notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text supra.
101. See, e.g., Mikulovsky v. State, 54 Wis.2d 699, 196 N.W.2d 748 (1972). But see Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 54 (1966), where the Supreme Court had before it an extremely
serious record of past offenses. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court remanded for a finding
on the question of amenability of treatment.
102. C.H. GROWDEN, A GROUP STUDY OF JUVENILE HOMICIDE (1949), cited in Sargent &
Gordon, 9 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 121 (1963).
103. See Rodman & Grams, supra note 97; SCHAFER & KNUDTEN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:
AN INTRODUCTION (1970).
104. One must remember that a large part of a court's function is the protection of
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This Article is not intended to offer a sociological model for
juvenile crime that might be applied in our courts. It is worth
noting, however, the apparent lack of clinical evaluation that has
gone into judicial determination of a juvenile's "amenability to
treatment." It does not suffice to say that "amenability to treat-
ment" is a legal rather than sociological concept. Undoubtedly,
a transfer decision requires application of a court's traditional
judgment.' "5 The criteria cited in the appendix to Kent include,
for example, the protection of society.' But that is only part of
the balancing of interests. The juvenile court is required to make
the complex determination whether a juvenile is amenable to
treatment. The case law generally indicates, however, a failure to
evolve relevant standards to identify those who would respond to
treatment. I°
VI. THE STATEMENT OF REASONS
Just as the Court failed to make clear the substantive elements
of amenability, it also failed to specify what constitutes an ade-
quate statement of reasons. Confusion in this area, as in the
"amenable to treatment" area, has led to a variety of ways in
which the juvenile court avoids the due process protections in-
society. This, in part, may account for some of the distrust between social scientists,
lawyers, and judges. See generally Brennan & Khinduka, Role Expectations of Social
Workers and Lawyers in the Juvenile Court, 17 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 191 (1971); Schultz,
The Adversary Process, the Juvenile Court and the Social Worker, 36 U. Mo.K.C. L. REv.
288 (1968). But see People v. Allgood, 54 Cal.App.3d 434, 447, 126 Cal. Rptr. 666, 674
(1976).
Testimony of expert witnesses may also provide guidance for the court's decision
on the fitness of a minor for treatment as a juvenile. . . .Since the dispositive
question is the minor's amenability to treatment through the facilities available
to the juvenile court, testimony of experts that the minor can be treated by those
facilities is entitled to great weight in the court's ultimate decision.
105. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 552-53: "We agree with the Court of
Appeals that the statute contemplates that the Juvenile Court should have considerable
latitude within which to determine whether it should retain jurisdiction over a child
106. 383 U.S. at 556. "1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and
whether the protection of the community requires waiver."
107. See notes 41-48 and accompanying text supra. For another thoughtful analysis of
relevant criteria, see R.K.M. v. State, 535 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). Once a lower
court considers such factors, however, quaere whether an appellate court will overturn the
substantive finding of nonamenability. See, e.g., People v. Allgood, 54 Cal. App. 3d 434,
126 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1976).
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tended by Kent. A review of the cases indicates several factual
situations in which that question arises: (1) when there is no
statement of reasons of record, largely because no hearing was
held at all; (2) when there is no statement of reasons, but the
court has before it the record of the hearing conducted below; (3)
when the statement of reasons is a rote recitation that the juve-
nile is amenable to treatment.
Lack of Hearing
Freeman Appeal'"' presents an instance of the first situation.
Five juveniles filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus following
their conviction in juvenile court on rape charges. After a hearing
had begun, the petitions were dismissed and all appellants were
certified to the district attorney for prosecution." 9
In reversing the conviction, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
emphasized that no hearing was held on the issue of certifica-
tion."" Under such circumstances, several grounds for reversal
existed. First, there was the failure of the court to provide a
statement of reasons for its decision to waive jurisdiction.,' In
addition, there was a denial of rights guaranteed by Gault at the
original delinquency hearing, and denial of effective assistance of
counsel at the hearing."12
No Statement of Reasons
The second situation, when there is no statement of reasons,
but the appellate court has before it a record of the proceedings,
is more complex. Courts have divided on whether that situation
can comport with the explicit requirement of Kent that a state-
ment of reasons appear of record." 3 Several courts have noted
108. 212 Pa.Super. 422, 242 A.2d 903 (1968); accord, State v. Yard, 109 Ariz.App. 198,
507 P.2d 123 (1973); Summers v. State, 248 Ind. 534, 230 N.E.2d 324 (1967); Kline v.
State, 86 Nev. 59, 464 P.2d 460 (1970); In re Mack, 22 Ohio App. 2d 201, 260 N.E.2d 619
(1970); Knott v. Langlos, 102 R.I. 517, 231 A.2d 767 (1967).
109. 212 Pa.Super. at 425, 24 A.2d at 905.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Lujan v. District Court, 161 Mont. 287, 505 P.2d 896 (1973); State v.
Madrigal, 85 N.M. 496, 513 P.2d 1278 (1973); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Slack, 17 Ore.
57, 520 P.2d 905 (1974); J.T.P. v. State, 544 P.2d 1270 (Okla. Crim. 1975); Kern v. State,
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that in Kent there was no indication that the juvenile court held
a hearing despite several motions by defense counsel."' The Ore-
gon Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Juvenile Department of
Washington County v. Slack"' rejected the necessity for a state-
ment of reasons because of the availability of de novo appellate
review, because the Oregon statute does not require written find-
ings, and because a juvenile court exercises jurisdiction as a court
of general and equitable jurisdiction by statute, and appeal from
its order is conducted in the same manner as an appeal in an
equity suit."' The court explained that in Oregon, de novo review
means review in the fullest sense." 7
No such requirement of de novo review was mandated by the
District of Columbia statutes, and thus, Kent's mandate that the
court prepare a statement of reasons is inapplicable in Oregon.
Despite superficial plausibility, the opinion does not consider the
implications of the noted exception to de novo review.'"' If con-
flicting testimony appeared in the record, the only guarantee of
meaningful review would be resort to findings by the lower court,
hence reintroducing the necessity of the Kent procedures.
Numerous courts have rejected the opportunity to review the
record without the lower court's statement of reasons."' At times,
522 P.2d 644 (Okla.Crim. 1974); Sherfield v. State, 511 P.2d 598 (Okla. 1973); In re Burtts,
12 Wash.App. 564, 530 P.2d 209 (1975). But see R.J.C. v. State, 520 P.2d 806 (Alas. 1974);
People v. Joe T., 48 Cal.App.3d 114, 121 Cal.Rptr. 329 (1975); Juan T. v. Superior Court,
49 Cal.App. 207, 122 Cal.Rptr. 405 (1975); In re Sturm, 11 Cal.3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113
Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974); Atkins v. State, 259 Ind. 596, 290 N.E.2d 441 (1972); State ex rel.
T.J.H. v. Bills, 504 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. 1974); In re J.R.C., 522 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975). The Kentucky courts initially rejected the position that a statement of reasons
could appear in the record itself and required a formal statement. Baker v. Common-
wealth, 500 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. 1973); Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d 592 (Ky.
1972). The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently decided that the statement may appear
on the record. Hubbs v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.2d 664 (Ky. 1974).
114. See, e.g., Imel v. State, 342 N.E.2d 897 (Ind. App. 1976); State v. Highly, 195 Neb.
498, 238 N.W.2d 909 (1976); Kern v. State, 522 P.2d 644 (Okla.Crim. 1974); State v.
Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973).
115. 17 Ore. 57, 520 P.2d 905 (1974).
116. Id. at 906.
117. Id. at 907, citing Hannan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 471 P.2d 831, 835 (Ore.App.
1970).
118. Id. "'This exception has been enunciated in terms of giving "great weight" to the
tribunal . ..who had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses and thus be better
able to weigh their credibility on disputed issues of fact.' "
119. See note 113 supra. J.T.P. v. State, 544 P.2d 1270 (Okla. Crim. 1975) is an interest-
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just as in Kent, the court has before it a record sufficient to
determine several objective factors. 2 ' Nevertheless, in such in-
stances, courts have generally remanded the case to the juvenile
court for a reconsideration of its original order. 2' State ex rel.
T.J.H. v. Bills2 ' is representative of this approach. There the
Missouri Supreme Court noted that a "reviewing court will not
be permitted the assumption that a juvenile court which has not
expressed the basis for the order of waiver had found the facts
necessary to such a judgment . .1.2."I3
In Juan T. v. Superior Court'24 the California Court of Appeals
also addressed this point and concluded that the statement of
reasons "is no make-work device."' 25 The court refused to affirm
the lower court because absent a statement of reasons, the court
could not determine whether the lower court as mandated by law
had considered relevant variables, such as a minor's past record
and behavior pattern described in the probation officer's report.'2
Rote Recitation May Be Sufficient
The third situation arises when the juvenile court merely an-
nounces its conclusion that the juvenile is not amenable to treat-
ment. For example, a lower court may state that "'said child is
ing case. The court remanded because the lower court made no finding on the prosecutive
merits of the state's case. More commonly, the lower court fails to make a finding on the
question of the juvenile's amenability to treatment. Because the appeal is from the judg-
ment of sentence after the transfer, the appellate court can infer the prosecutive merit
from the result of the trial.
120. These factors include the age of the juvenile, seriousness of the offense, prosecutive
merit of the claim, cf. State ex rel. T.J.H. v. Bills, 504 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. 1974), prior
contacts of the juvenile with the juvenile justice system, see, e.g., Juan T. v. Superior
Court, 49 Cal.App. 207, 122 Cal.Rptr. 405 (1975), and the existence of other, adult co-
defendants. Welfare of J.F.C. v. State, 225 N.W.2d 245 (Minn. 1975). In addition, the
court may also have available in the record psychiatric and psychological reports submit-
ted to the lower court.
121. See note 12 supra.
122. 504 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. 1974). But see State v. Kemper, 535 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App.
1976).
123. Id. at 82.
124. 49 Cal.App.3d 207, 122 Cal.Rptr. 405 (1975).
125. Id.
126. Id. But see People v. Allgood, 54 Cal. App. 3d 434, 126 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1976). Once
the lower court provides an adequate statement of reasons, an appellate court is appar-
ently hesitant to substitute its judgment for that of the lower court, acting on recommen-
dation of an expert witness.
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not a suitable candidate for the rehabilitation program of the
juvenile court' and the finding is that it is in the best interest of
the public that jurisdiction be waived."'' 7 The problem is whether
such a rote recitation amounts to a finding of fact and a state-
ment of reasons in support of the decision to waive jurisdiction
over the juvenile.
This problem arose in Commonwealth v. Greiner.2' The court
simply stated that the juvenile
is not amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation
through available facilities for juveniles . . . that the juvenile
is not committable to an institution for mentally retarded or
mentally ill; that the interests of the Community require that
the juvenile be placed under legal restraint or discipline .... "I
The crime involved was unquestionably serious and violent."'
Under the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act,"' however, the court must
evaluate several factors in addition to the seriousness of the of-
fense before it can waive jurisdiction over the juvenile. In fact, at
the transfer hearing in Greiner, considerable evidence concerning
the prospects of the youth's capacity for rehabilitation was pre-
sented: Greiner was only 15 years old, and therefore, would be
subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for six years;' 2 a
probation officer testified that appellant came from a good fam-
ily, that he performed well academically, that he was in the top
20% of his ninth grade class, and that he had never been in
trouble in school or with the police previously.'33 Nonetheless, the
127. B.P.W. v. State, 214 So.2d 365, 366-67 (Fla. 1968). See also J.E.M. v. State,
217 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1968). The current approach of the Florida court is unclear. W.B. v.
State, 313 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1975), follows B.P.W. and J.E.M. Davis v. State, 297 So.2d 289
(Fla. 1974), holds that the statutory requirement of a finding on the issue of amenability
to rehabilitation is merely directory and, therefore, no finding on the issue of the child's
best interest is required at all.
128. 234 Pa.Super. 705 (abstract), 344 A.2d 915 (1975).
129. 344 A.2d at 921-22 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
130. The juvenile, his 19 year old brother, and a friend of the brother, planned to kidnap
a schoolmate. On their arrival, the juveniles found that the schoolmate was not at home.
Therefore, they kidnapped the boy's father and subsequently beat and stabbed him. Id.
131. The Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, 11 PA. STAT. §50-325(a) (1972).
132. 344 A.2d at 921. The Pennsylvania statute provided that juvenile jurisdiction
terminated at the juvenile's 21st birthday. 11 PA. STAT. §50-102 (1972).
133. 344 A.2d 915. The appellate court was denied one extremely relevant piece of data,
the psychologist's report regarding capacity for rehabilitation. Id. at 924-25.
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lower court found that the juvenile was not amenable to treat-
ment.'34 A majority of the Pennsylvania Superior Court recog-
nized that Kent, Pennsylvania decisions, and the Pennsylvania
Juvenile Act mandated a finding of nonamenability to treat-
ment.' The court held that the juvenile court's finding of nona-
menability was a legally sufficient finding under Kent."',
Neither the majority nor any of the three dissenting judges
addressed the substantive issue of whether, given the numerous
factors which pointed towards rehabilitation, the lower court
erred in its finding. The majority upheld the court's exercise of
its discretion; both dissenting opinions would have remanded for
the introduction of the evidence excluded at the hearing.
Statement of Reasons Can Protect a Juvenile Offender
The demand for a statement of reasons is not merely an aca-
demic one. It may be that an appellate court has limited ability
to judge the merits of a particular transfer decision."7 The use of
psychological and psychiatric data creates a particular dilemma
for the reviewing court. A per se rule that a juvenile court is
bound by recommendations of expert witnesses would remove the
decision from the legal system. At the same time, an appellate
court is not likely to possess sufficient expertise to make the
substantive judgment that a juvenile is capable of rehabilitation.
Therefore, if the lower court rejects the expert's recommendation
concerning the juvenile, it is unlikely that an appellate court
could substitute its judgment. 3 Nonetheless, a statement of rea-
sons does provide some protection for the juvenile offender.
Several cases indicate the importance of such a statement. ' In
In re Barker,40 the juvenile court found that the minor needed
134. Id. at 922.
135. Id. at 917.
136. Id. at 918.
137. See In re Maricopa County, 18 Ariz.App. 560, 504 P.2d 501 (1972), on the complex
balance which the court must strike between data from the social sciences and its own
sense concerning the juvenile's likelihood of being treated.
138. See generally Hays & Solway, The Role of Psychological Evaluation in Certifica-
tion of Juveniles for Trial as Adults, 9 HOUST. L. REv. 709 (1972). Cf. People v. Allgood,
54 Cal. App. 3d 434, 126 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1976).
139. Cf. Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Juan T. v. Superior
Court, 49 Cal. App. 207, 122 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1975).
140. 17 Md.App. 714, 305 A.2d 211 (1973).
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extensive medical treatment in a residential setting."' Neverthe-
less, at the close of the waiver hearing, the juvenile court judge
waived jurisdiction, reasoning that it could not be determined if
treatment could be complete by the time the juvenile reached the
age of 21, at which time the court would lose jurisdiction over the
juvenile.'42
The appellate court, after independently reviewing the psy-
chological and psychiatric reports contained in the record, found
insufficient evidence to justify the court's finding that treatment
would extend beyond appellant's majority. The court stated "(I)n
our view, the evidence in this record does not go beyond a bare
showing of the possibility that effective treatment of the appel-
lant might require his detention beyond his majority. That mere
possibility is not enough to justify waiver on the facts of this
case."'
4 3
Ingram v. State' is another example of meaningful inquiry by
an appellate court through its review of the juvenile court's dis-
cussion of the transfer decision. By statute,"' the Indiana legisla-
ture required an investigation of certain personal and social cri-
teria before making a waiver decision. Because the lower court
was required to state on the record its reasons for the waiver
decision, the reviewing court could determine whether the lower
court had complied with the state statute. The court's failure to
conduct the required inquiry resulted in a defective waiver.' 4
Although an appellate court is not ideally suited to make the
decision that a juvenile is not amenable to treatment, its vigorous
review of a juvenile court's determination appears to have an
ameliorative effect in preventing summary treatment of juve-
niles. Viewed in this light, one sees the inadequacy of a court's
upholding a rote recitation that the juvenile court has found the
juvenile is not amenable to treatment.
141. Id. at 719, 305 A.2d at 214-15.
142. Id. at 719, 305 A.2d at 215.
143. Id. at 720, 305 A.2d at 216.
144. 310 N.E.2d 903 (Ind. App. 1974).
145. IND. ANN. SrAT. §9-3208 (Supp. 1966).
146. 310 N.E.2d at 904.
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VII. STATUTORY CIRCUMVENTION
By Redefinition
At the same time that courts have wrestled with the elusive
protective concept of "amenability to treatment," legislators
apparently have responded to the public outcry for harsher treat-
ment for juvenile criminal offenders.1 7 An example of this is the
District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act
of 1970114 which substantially revised the juvenile court proce-
dure. 45 The Kent requirement of a full hearing prior to waiver was
avoided for some offenders by redefining the term child. The new
definition includes those persons under 16 years of age but ex-
cludes those who reach 16 years and are charged by the United
States Attorney with murder, forcible rape, burglary in the first
degree, armed robbery, or assault with attempt to commit any
such offense. 5 ' In the absence of this automatic certification, the
statute provides procedures whereby the juvenile may, on mo-
tion, be certified to adult court.'5 '
The impetus for the new waiver standard was based on statisti-
cal information which indicated that certain violent crimes had
increased dramatically between 1963 and 1969,1'2 and that 61% of
the cases referred to juvenile court in the third quarter of 1969
involved children previously referred to it.' 3  Congress
undoubtedly looked upon these figures as indicative of the con-
firmed nature of juvenile offenders as habitual criminals and as
proof of their sophistication. Seventy-nine percent of that 61%
were still under the court's jurisdiction when the second crime
147. See Darling, Youthful Offenders and Neglected Children Under the District of
Columbia Crime Act, 20 AM. U. L. REV. 373 (1970-71).
One clear campaign against the treatment model of justice was ushered in by former
President Nixon's early efforts aimed at"curbing crime and improving the conditions of
life in the city of Washington." Id. at 373, citing 5 WEEKLY COMP. PRESIDENTIAL Docs. 197
(Feb. 3, 1969).
148. D.C. CODE ANN. §16-2301 (1971).
149. See generally Lawton, Juvenile Proceedings-The New Look, 20 AM. U. L. REV.
342 (1970-71).
There is some indication in the statutory history that the legislation was intended to
circumvent Kent. Id. at 353.
150. D.C. CODE ANN. §16-2301(3)(A) (Supp. IV, 1971).
151. Id. Lawton, supra note 149, at 359.
152. Id. at 347.
153. Darling, supra note 147, at 383.
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took place.'54 Though cited as proof of sophistication, this statistic
tells little about whether they committed serious offenses. That
they were not being detained in a juvenile facility at the time of
their repeated offenses, the nature of which is not analyzed in the
Department's data, suggests that many of the recidivists were
initially involved in trivial offenses.
Automatic certification in part avoids the problems raised by
Kent."' A judge does not have to make the complex determina-
tion of amenability to treatment because the legislature has pro-
vided that the criminal court has original jurisdiction if the juve-
nile is charged with certain crimes. In fact, however, automatic
certification places the transfer decision in one of the areas of law
least subject to judicial review,' and thus invites arbitrary pro-
cedure and circumvention of the principles of juvenile justice. A
district attorney is traditionally more likely than a judge to be
responsive to political pressure, and thus more likely to seek
transfer of jurisdiction in response to society's demand for retri-
bution and to ignore the rehabilitative considerations upon which
the juvenile justice system is premised. Further, as an adversary,
a prosecutor is less likely than a judge to consider the welfare of
the accused. Thus, Congress' decision to avoid the transfer
procedure circumvents the holding of Kent that a decision of
such tremendous consequences should not be rendered without
ceremony."'
Because automatic certification forecloses review of the prose-
cutor's decision to charge the juvenile with a certain crime, two
distinct but related questions are raised: (1) Does the procedure
deny the juvenile due process in that there is no assurance that
the prosecutor has conformed with the basic requirements of fair-
ness that Kent suggests must be afforded juveniles? (2) Does the
procedure create equal protection problems in that the prosecu-
tor's decision to charge the juvenile with a specified crime is the
basis for excluding the child from the care, rehabilitation, and
shorter periods of incarceration that exist in the juvenile system?
154. Id.
155. For a list of jurisdictions that employ some form of automatic certification, see
United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1334 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
156. See, e.g., Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963).
157. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 554.
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By Prosecutorial Discretion
Not only do statutory revisions restrict Kent's due process pro-
tections for juvenile offenders, but prosecutorial discretion, which
may be nothing more than police discretion, limits Kent's appli-
cation. If a criminal proceeding begins by information, no hearing
is required.'56 If a criminal proceeding follows a grand jury indict-
ment, there is serious doubt whether the defendant has received
any protection from the zeal of the prosecutor and the police. '5
5
Even in jurisdictions where the defendant receives a preliminary
hearing, several reasons exist for finding that the defendant is not
fully protected. First, a magistrate has the assurance that if he
errs in finding sufficient evidence to send a charge to trial, his
judgment will be reviewed, but that if he dismisses a charge his
decision is unlikely to be reviewed. It follows, therefore, that the
threshold level of proof " " and evidence"' are quite low. Further-
more, defense counsel may be severely limited in scope of cross-
examination or may strategically forego such cross-exam. "2
Also, it is common knowledge that prosecutors often overcharge
in a criminal complaint. "" If charges are dismissed at the prelimi-
nary hearing stage, there are still adequate grounds on which to
proceed. More importantly, multiple charges give the prosecutor
further leverage in plea bargaining.14
158. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913).
159. See, e.g., Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51
A.B.A.J. 153, 154 (1965): "It simply is not true that the grand jury system protects the
individual from oppression; indeed it has far greater potential as an instrument of oppres-
sion." Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REV. 101 (1931), suggests
that grand juries disagreed with the prosecutor in only 5% of the cases presented to them.
See also Whyte, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. REV. 461 (1959).
160. For the low threshold of proof required under a probable cause standard, see
Rideout v. Superior Court, 67 Cal.2d 471, 432 P.2d 197, 62 Cal.Rptr. 581 (1967). For
comprehensive examination and critique of the inadequacy of probable cause and of a
prima facie standard as evidentiary standards of proof at the preliminary hearing, see
Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973).
161. See, e.g., Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
162. See dissenting opinion by Brennan, J., in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189
(1970).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.):
"The vogue for repetitious multiple count indictments may well produce an increase in
seemingly inconsistent jury verdicts, where in fact the jury is using its power to prevent
punishment from getting too far out of line with the crime." Id. at 902.
164. See Newman, Reshape the Deal, 9 TRIAL, No. 3, 11-15 (1973).
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In general, the broad discretion entrusted to the prosecution is
not reviewable.15 In United States v. Bland ' the method by
which the transfer decision was made was challenged, rather than
the power of the United States Attorney to make the decision. "7
In dismissing the juvenile's argument, the court stated that this
theory ignores the widely accepted concept of prosecutorial dis-
cretion which is derived from the constitutional doctrine of the
separation of powers.' Only if exceptional circumstances, such
as race, religion, or other arbitrary classifications, were found
would a review of discretion be permitted.'
The court in Bland also considered the argument that the stat-
ute creating a special classification of juvenile, to be treated dif-
ferently than others, violates equal protection."" In rejecting this
argument, that court stated that because of the increase in seri-
ous crimes committed by juveniles over the age of sixteen, Con-
gress had a valid justification for creating this classification."'
The dissent, however, pointed out that despite the appearance of
validity, the statute was merely an attempt to avoid the impact
of Kent.' Nevertheless, the general rule is that an apparently
165. Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963).
166. 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
167. Id. at 1338.
168. Id. at 1335.
169. Id. at 1336. See also Comment, Youthful Offenders and Adult Courts: Prosecu-
torial Discretion vs. Juvenile Rights, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1184 (1973), where the author has
analogized the situation presented in Bland to the interests of a welfare recipient:
Just as Kent and Gault protect juvenile status from judicial divestment, the
Supreme Court has explicitly held in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
that a welfare recipient has a property interest in continued benefits which so
outweighs governmental interests in administrative efficiency that even a tem-
porary suspension of benefits must comport with due process. A youth's interest
in juvenile treatment-with its obviously significant implications for his lib-
erty-is as much within the protection of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
as is the welfare recipient's property interest in continued benefits.
Id. at 1190.
170. 472 F.2d at 1333-34.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1341.
The "substantial difficulties ... under present law" to which the Committee
coyly refers are, of course, none other than the constitutional rights explicated
in the Kent decision. And the "better mechanism" which the Committee pro-
poses is a system for running roughshod over those rights.
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unconstitutional legislative motive to abrogate due process rights
of juveniles does not invalidate a statute otherwise constitu-
tional.'73
An Increase in Prosecutorial Discretion
The principle upheld in Bland that some juveniles are not enti-
tled to separate treatment has been used to justify another,
slightly broader grant of prosecutorial discretion which denies a
due process hearing in the original jurisdiction decision. The Illi-
nois legislature provides that the state attorney general deter-
mines the court of original jurisdiction.' In the event that the
juvenile court judge objects to a transfer, the matter is referred
to the chief judge."' The Illinois Supreme Court, in upholding the
statute and a long line of Illinois cases, 7 ' held that since there is
no constitutional requirement to create a juvenile court, a due
process hearing as prescribed in Kent is not required at the time
of the attorney general's decision.'77
In United States ex rel. Bom bacino v. Bensinger,' the Seventh
Circuit considered the constitutionality of the Illinois statute. In
denying a petition for habeas corpus, the court noted authority
for providing the prosecutor with complete discretion.'79 Under
this view, unless the state elects to provide judicial participation
in the transfer decision, procedural safeguards would not be con-
stitutionally required. Absent such statutory authority, the rele-
vant test was whether any fundamental unfairness appeared on
173. Id. at 1342.
174. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §702-7(3) (1967).
175. Id.
176. People v. Sprinkle, 56 Ill.2d 257, 307 N.E.2d 161 (1974); People v. Bombacino, 51
1ll.2d 17, 280 N.E.2d 697, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912 (1972); People v. Lane, 28 Ill.App.3d
906, 330 N.E.2d 149 (5th Dist. 1975); People v. Rahn, 15 Ill.App.3d 170, 304 N.E.2d 161
(4th Dist. 1973); People v. Brookaw, 12 Ill.App.3d 221, 299 N.E.2d 20 (3d Dist. 1973).
177. People v. Bombacino, 51 1ll.2d at 17, 280 N.E.2d at 69.
178. 498 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, C.J.).
179. The court cited the following:
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that
confining the decision to transfer totally to the prosecutor's discretion did not
violate the Due Process Clause. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.
1973). In People v. Jiles, 43 Ill.2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1969), Justice
Schaefer expressed the same view . . ..
401 F.2d at 877.
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the record. Also, a statement of reasons was not required because
it would not serve any function in the prosecutor's decision.""
VIII. CONCLUSION
If Supreme Court decisions are to guide lower courts, not
merely to resolve disputes between the parties before it, Kent v.
United States has fallen short of meeting that goal. First, while
Kent did mandate that constitutional procedural due process
protections be met in a waiver decision, it left unsettled which
substantive criteria were to be determinative in the statement of
reasons.' 8' Second, though courts have found the term "amenable
to treatment" and "best interest," especially when incorporating
the Kent criteria, sufficiently precise to guide juvenile courts,
they have almost universally failed to delineate the meaning of
the terms.' 2 Instead, even when applying the Kent criteria,
courts have relied almost exclusively on the seriousness of the
crime' 3 and the juvenile's prior contact with the juvenile court
system,' 4 or they apply arbitrarily non-Kent criteria of cost and
availability of treatment or emancipation to the waiver deci-
sion. "I
In addition to problems relating directly to ambiguity within
the Kent decision, appellate courts have failed to effectuate the
underlying juvenile policy of Kent in two critical ways. First,
many courts have not demanded an adequate statement of rea-
sons in support of the transfer decision, a specific requirement of
Kent.'8 Second, courts have allowed prosecutorial discretion to
limit Kent by originally assigning juvenile cases to adult court,
bypassing the constitutional safeways of the waiver procedure
180. Id.
181. See notes 11-14 and accompanying text supra.
182. See notes 41-56 and accompanying text supra.
18:3. See notes 60-68 and accompanying text supra. See also Chicago Tribune, Septem-
ber 17, 1976 at 1, col. 1. Florida is trying a 12 year old boy for murder as an adult because
its statute provides that minors will be tried in adult court where (1) the crime is of a
severe nature and the juvenile is not amenable to treatment and, (2) the county grand
jury returns an indictment.
184. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
185. See notes 77-97 and accompanying text, supra.
186. See notes 108-26 and accompanying text supra. Also, rote recitation that a juvenile
is not amenable to treatment has avoided that rationale of Kent. See notes 127-36 and
accompanying text supra.
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and by permitting lower standards of proof and evidence and less
opportunity for cross-examination. 7 Finally, the uncertain moor-
ing of Kent has permitted automatic certification by statute of
sixteen-year-old juveniles who have committed serious crimes.
This statutory circumvention of Kent creates a broad exception
to Kent's attempt to introduce meaningful review into the trans-
fer decision. "'
More importantly, courts have not addressed more complex
questions. Are certain classes of offenders more or less amenable
to treatment? Does seriousness of the offense correlate with the
offender's capacity for treatment? What variables correlate with
amenability to treatment? What percentage of the juvenile treat-
ment facilities are rehabilitative? Questions such as these remain
the province of social scientists; there is apparently less than
complete communication between social scientists, judges and
lawyers. Absent such inquiry, it is doubtful that Kent can have
the full ameliorative effect on the juvenile justice system that was
apparently intended.
187. See notes 158-77 and accompanying text supra.
188. See notes 147-57 and accompanying text supra.
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